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Robust Mechanism Design and Robust Prediction in Games

Total Cost €


EC-Contrib. €






Project "ROBUST" data sheet

The following table provides information about the project.


Organization address
address: ALLEE DE BRIENNE, Manufacture des Tabacs 21
postcode: 31000
website: n.a.

contact info
title: n.a.
name: n.a.
surname: n.a.
function: n.a.
email: n.a.
telephone: n.a.
fax: n.a.

 Coordinator Country France [FR]
 Total cost 1˙295˙062 €
 EC max contribution 1˙295˙062 € (100%)
 Programme 1. H2020-EU.1.1. (EXCELLENT SCIENCE - European Research Council (ERC))
 Code Call ERC-2016-STG
 Funding Scheme ERC-STG
 Starting year 2016
 Duration (year-month-day) from 2016-12-01   to  2021-11-30


Take a look of project's partnership.

# participants  country  role  EC contrib. [€] 


 Project objective

In the last several decades, it has been extensively studied how strategic behavior of economic agents could affect the outcomes of various institutions. Game theory and mechanism design theory play key roles in understanding economic agents' possible behavior in those institutions, its welfare consequences, and how we should design economic institutions to achieve desired social objectives even if the agents behave strategically for their own interests. However, existing studies mostly focus on somewhat narrow classes of economic environments by imposing restrictive assumptions. The proposed projects aim at providing novel theoretical frameworks which enable us to study agents' behavior and desirable institutions under much less assumptions. I believe that the projects have significant relevance in policy recommendation in practice and empirical studies, even though the proposed projects are primarily theoretical. In mechanism design, most papers in the literature focus on environments with independently distributed private information. We propose two novel (robustness-based) approaches to analyze mechanism design in correlated environments, motivated by their practical and empirical relevance. The robustness brought by my approach can be useful to mitigate certain types of misspecifications in mechanism design in practice. Moreover, the desirable robust mechanisms I obtain appear to be more sensible, and hence, can be useful for empirical studies of auction and other mechanism design problems. In game theory, it is often assumed that the game to be played is common knowledge, or even with uncertainty, uncertain variables are assumed to follow a common-knowledge prior .However, in many situations in reality, those do not seem to be satisfied. Our goal is to provide a novel theoretical framework to predict players' behavior in such incompletely specified games, and to identify conditions for (monotone) comparative statics. Both could be useful in empirical studies.


year authors and title journal last update
List of publications.
2019 Fumitoshi Moriya, Takuro Yamashita
Asymmetric‐information allocation to avoid coordination failure
published pages: 173-186, ISSN: 1058-6407, DOI: 10.1111/jems.12329
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 29/1 2020-03-11
2020 Shintaro Miura, Takuro Yamashita
Maximal miscommunication
published pages: 108962, ISSN: 0165-1765, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.108962
Economics Letters 188 2020-03-11
2018 Nozomu Muto, Yasuhiro Shirata et Takuro Yamashita
Revenue-capped efficient auctions
published pages: , ISSN: , DOI:
TSE Working Paper 18-940 2020-03-11
2018 Takuro Yamashita
Revenue guarantee in auction with a (correlated) common prior and additional information
published pages: , ISSN: , DOI:
TSE Working Paper 18-937 2020-03-11
2018 Takashi Kunimoto et Takuro Yamashita
Order on types based on monotone comparative statics
published pages: , ISSN: , DOI:
TSE Working Paper 18-942 2020-03-11
2018 Shintaro Miura et Takuro Yamashita
Divergent Interpretation and Divergent Prediction in Communication
published pages: , ISSN: , DOI:
TSE Working Paper 18-939 2020-03-11
2018 Fumitoshi Moriya et Takuro Yamashita
Asymmetric information allocation to avoid coordination failure
published pages: , ISSN: , DOI:
TSE Working Paper 18-941 2020-03-11
2018 Takuro Yamashita et Shuguang Zhu
On the foundations of ex post incentive compatible mechanisms
published pages: , ISSN: , DOI:
TSE Working paper 18-938 2020-03-11
2018 Takuro Yamashita
Optimal public information disclosure by mechanism designer
published pages: , ISSN: , DOI:
TSE Working Paper 18-936 2020-03-11

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The information about "ROBUST" are provided by the European Opendata Portal: CORDIS opendata.

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