#	Pagina
attuale pagina	/open-h2020/projects/206487/index.html

Opendata, web and dolomites

TBTF SIGNED

Addressing Too Big to Fail: Resolution, Organizational Structure, and Funding of Global Banks

Total Cost €

EC-Contrib. €

Partnership

Views

Outcomes and
results

TBTF project word cloud

Explore the words cloud of the TBTF project. It provides you a very rough idea of what is the project "TBTF" about.

generate public too bank financial intermediation sweeping costly rules guarantees single regulation scope brothers recognizes subfields repercussions risk collapse law theory prevent explicitly mechanisms moral form corporate absent economy structure resolution theories feedback lehman policymakers perspective global banks one holistic national implicit economics regarding hazard finance crisis deal investment vividly equally orderly decisions mechanism interdisciplinary failures big dilemma methodological prior drawing regulators incentives insights govern fail emphasizing optimal larger society debated organizational legislation inform demonstrated size modeling view bankruptcy unresolved struggling

Project "TBTF" data sheet

The following table provides information about the project.

Coordinator	LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE Organization address address: Houghton Street 1 city: LONDON postcode: WC2A 2AE website: www.lse.ac.uk contact info title: n.a. name: n.a. surname: n.a. function: n.a. email: n.a. telephone: n.a. fax: n.a.
Coordinator Country	United Kingdom [UK]
Total cost	1˙489˙518 €
EC max contribution	1˙489˙518 € (100%)
Programme	1. H2020-EU.1.1. (EXCELLENT SCIENCE - European Research Council (ERC))
Code Call	ERC-2016-STG
Funding Scheme	ERC-STG
Starting year	2016
Duration (year-month-day)	from 2016-12-01 to 2021-11-30

Partnership

Take a look of project's partnership.

#	participants	country	role	EC contrib. [€]
1	LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE Organization address address: Houghton Street 1 city: LONDON postcode: WC2A 2AE website: www.lse.ac.uk contact info title: n.a. name: n.a. surname: n.a. function: n.a. email: n.a. telephone: n.a. fax: n.a.	UK (LONDON)	coordinator	1˙489˙518.00

Map

Project objective

One of the main unresolved challenges of the recent financial crisis is how society should deal with global banks that are “too big to fail.” The collapse of Lehman Brothers vividly demonstrated the costs of the failure of such an institution, with sweeping repercussions for the financial system and the broader economy. Yet, implicit public guarantees that would prevent such failures are equally costly, creating moral hazard in the form of increased risk taking and incentives for financial institutions to become larger and more complex.

The research in this proposal will address this dilemma. From a methodological perspective, my research will advance the state of the art in financial intermediation theory by explicitly modeling the failure and resolution of global banks, emphasizing crucial elements that are absent from leading theories: the design of mechanisms that allow for an orderly resolution of struggling global financial institutions, the incentives of national authorities in the regulation and resolution of global banks, the role of the corporate and organizational structure of global banks, as well as their optimal size and scope. The proposed approach is interdisciplinary; it will generate novel insights by drawing on different subfields within economics (corporate finance theory, organizational economics) and aspects of bankruptcy law. Moreover, the research will take a holistic view that explicitly recognizes the two-way feedback between the rules that govern bank resolution and decisions on funding, investment, and size taken by banks prior to a potential resolution. Overall, the findings from this research will be directly relevant for regulators and policymakers. For example, they will inform currently debated legislation regarding the regulation and resolution of global banks, such as the Single Resolution Mechanism in the EU.

Publications

List of publications.
year	authors and title	journal	last update
2018	Patrick Bolton, Martin Oehmke Bank Resolution and the Structure of Global Banks published pages: 2384-2421, ISSN: 0893-9454, DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhy123	The Review of Financial Studies 32/6	2019-08-05
2019	Chong Huang, Martin Oehmke, Hongda Zhong A Theory of Multiperiod Debt Structure published pages: , ISSN: 0893-9454, DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhz026	The Review of Financial Studies	2019-08-05

Are you the coordinator (or a participant) of this project? Plaese send me more information about the "TBTF" project.

For instance: the website url (it has not provided by EU-opendata yet), the logo, a more detailed description of the project (in plain text as a rtf file or a word file), some pictures (as picture files, not embedded into any word file), twitter account, linkedin page, etc.

Send me an email (fabio@fabiodisconzi.com) and I put them in your project's page as son as possible.

Thanks. And then put a link of this page into your project's website.

The information about "TBTF" are provided by the European Opendata Portal: CORDIS opendata.