SWEAC

"The Strong, the Weak and the Cunning: Power and Strategy in Voting Games"

 Coordinatore OBUDAI EGYETEM 

 Organization address address: BECSI UT 96 B
city: BUDAPEST
postcode: 1034

contact info
Titolo: Dr.
Nome: András
Cognome: Medve
Email: send email
Telefono: 3616665201
Fax: 3616665209

 Nazionalità Coordinatore Hungary [HU]
 Totale costo 45˙000 €
 EC contributo 45˙000 €
 Programma FP7-PEOPLE
Specific programme "People" implementing the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Community for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2007 to 2013)
 Code Call FP7-PEOPLE-ERG-2008
 Funding Scheme MC-ERG
 Anno di inizio 2008
 Periodo (anno-mese-giorno) 2008-09-30   -   2011-09-29

 Partecipanti

# participant  country  role  EC contrib. [€] 
1    OBUDAI EGYETEM

 Organization address address: BECSI UT 96 B
city: BUDAPEST
postcode: 1034

contact info
Titolo: Dr.
Nome: András
Cognome: Medve
Email: send email
Telefono: 3616665201
Fax: 3616665209

HU (BUDAPEST) coordinator 9˙000.00
2    Budapesti M?szaki F?iskola

 Organization address city: BUDAPEST
postcode: 1034

contact info
Titolo: Dr.
Nome: András
Cognome: Medve
Email: send email
Telefono: 3616665201
Fax: 3616665209

HU (BUDAPEST) participant 36˙000.00

Mappa


 Word cloud

Esplora la "nuvola delle parole (Word Cloud) per avere un'idea di massima del progetto.

game    situation    coalition    indices    voting    model    union    priori    games    theoretical    players    coalitions    strategic    winning    power   

 Obiettivo del progetto (Objective)

'The recent extensions of the European Union brought a priori measures of voting power (power measures or power indices) in the spotlight. Originating from game theory these measures serve as indicators of the voting powers of players in a given voting situation. However, a priori measures of voting power are no more than statistical expectations of power as a result of random voting and therefore power indices lack the game theoretical features attributed to them. We rebuild these game theoretical foundations by introducing strategic power indices: we expand the model by allowing players to reject particular coalitions and thereby possibly increase their power. We characterise strategic power indices and apply them to real-life voting situations, such as the European Union’s Council of Ministers. We discuss implications to values, in particular the Shapley value. Further, we extend these models to farsighted players, players with preferences, such as for games on convex geometries and for games on networks. We also consider a modification of strategic power indices where players can renegotiate blocked coalitions and in these negotiations different credits can be given to critical/pivotal players in the same coalition. Finally, we develop a model to calculate the “true” power of a winning coalition in a parliamentary voting situation, where the power of a particular coalition belongs to the interval [0,1] to reflect the margin by which it is winning/losing.'

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