THICK VALUE CONCEPTS
"Thick Evaluative Concepts: Value, Reasons, and the Natural World"
| Coordinatore | UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS
Organization address
address: WOODHOUSE LANE contact info |
| Nazionalità Coordinatore | United Kingdom [UK] |
| Totale costo | 100˙000 € |
| EC contributo | 100˙000 € |
| Programma | FP7-PEOPLE
Specific programme "People" implementing the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Community for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2007 to 2013) |
| Code Call | FP7-PEOPLE-IRG-2008 |
| Funding Scheme | MC-IRG |
| Anno di inizio | 2009 |
| Periodo (anno-mese-giorno) | 2009-01-01 - 2012-12-31 |
Partecipanti
| # | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 |
UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS
Organization address
address: WOODHOUSE LANE contact info |
UK (LEEDS) | coordinator | 100˙000.00 |
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Obiettivo del progetto (Objective)
'Developments in linguistics and metaphysics open unprecedented opportunities for advances using up-to-date methods from these areas in metaethics: an area of moral philosophy that studies these topics as they arise with respect to normative issues. The proposed research is a full-scale study of “thick” evaluative concepts, led by the coordinator of this proposal and building on his US work with such methods in metaethical study of general moral principles and their role in moral knowledge and guidance. The goal of the proposed work is to enable the coordinator to transition his methods to new work on thick value concepts and establish himself in European context. The project is unique in using up-to-date work in linguistics on gradable adjectives to analyse the meaning of evaluative language, focusing on concepts that are “thick” in that they combine evaluation with robust natural non-evaluative conditions on their applicability (e.g. 'cruel', 'honest'). It will determine whether these elements of thick concepts decompose and so whether there is any basis for a robust fact-value distinction. It will investigate whether thick value judgements express beliefs that can be true or false or non-cognitive sentiments that cannot, and whether thick concepts correspond to real properties in the natural world. The project's innovative methodology, and the new perspectives and results it enables, will have a major impact on the state of the art. The project is timely and humanly relevant, especially given the role thick concepts play in moral disagreements that reflect cultural and social differences. The proposed project enables the reintegration of a world-class, experienced European researcher. It is designed to stimulate interaction and collaboration among US and European researchers, and is fully aligned with the coordinator's forthcoming senior, long-term role at a major UK host organisation, the University of Leeds, so as to secure a strong knowledge transfer path.'
Introduzione (Teaser)
Exploring the connection between linguistics and metaphysics is both timely and necessary given the important role language can play in moral disagreements reflecting cultural and social differences. EU-funded research sought to advance a new approach to the central topic of meta-ethics: the meaning and function of evaluative language and concepts.
Descrizione progetto (Article)
The 'Thick evaluative concepts: Value, reasons, and the natural world' (THICK VALUE CONCEPTS) project aimed to contribute to and challenge contemporary discussions of 'thick concepts'.
This term is generally assigned to notions or ideas that combine descriptive and evaluative concepts.
The word selfish, for example, can be argued as being inherently evaluative as it conveys a negative characterisation.
More specifically, this study focused on the distinction between thick concepts (e.g.
cruelty, courage) and the somehow more purely evaluative 'thin' concepts (e.g.
moral goodness, wrongness).
The first main objective was to apply and extend methods and techniques from linguistics and philosophy of language to make the approach to the topic more robust.
At a more fundamental level, the second objective was to establish a radical novel theory of the relationship between thick terms and concepts and evaluation.
Both objectives were achieved through work carried out across five areas.
Research involved collecting and analysing extensive linguistic evidence to counter the standard semantic views on the relationship between thick terms and concepts and evaluation.The project tested the hypothesis that relevant evaluations are a certain kind of generalised pragmatic implications of utterances involving thick terms and concepts.
This exercise succeeded in offering a better explanation of the linguistic evidence.
The hypothesis was further supported by discussing how evaluation can emerge in thick evaluative discourse if not based on the meanings of thick terms and concepts.Work in the fourth area of concentration also indirectly supported the hypothesis.
That is, various phenomena treated as inherently evaluative in meaning can be explained with more general principles that have nothing in particular to do with being evaluative.Already being hailed as game-changer in the particular field, THICK VALUE CONCEPTS contributed new knowledge and a fresh foundation for the study of thick terms and concepts.
The findings support its argument that these concepts do not have distinct significance for the wide range of moral philosophy issues they have been claimed to impact.