"UNITED, DIVIDED"

United we stand devided we fall: How the web of political institutions influence legislators' behaviour

Coordinatore	TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY    more  Organization address address: RAMAT AVIV city: TEL AVIV postcode: 69978 contact info Titolo: Ms. Nome: Lea Cognome: Pais Email: send email Telefono: 97236408774 Fax: 97236409697
Nazionalità Coordinatore	Israel [IL]
Totale costo	100˙000 €
EC contributo	100˙000 €
Programma	FP7-PEOPLE Specific programme "People" implementing the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Community for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2007 to 2013)
Code Call	FP7-PEOPLE-2010-RG
Funding Scheme	MC-IRG
Anno di inizio	2011
Periodo (anno-mese-giorno)	2011-06-01   -   2015-05-31

 Partecipanti

#	participant	country	role	EC contrib. [€]
1	TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY  Organization address address: RAMAT AVIV city: TEL AVIV postcode: 69978 contact info Titolo: Ms. Nome: Lea Cognome: Pais Email: send email Telefono: 97236408774 Fax: 97236409697	IL (TEL AVIV)	coordinator	100˙000.00

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 Obiettivo del progetto (Objective)

'What causes politicians to vote against their parties’ wishes? What causes parties to exhibit less or greater discipline? How do institutions influence the way legislatures, parties and parliament members behave? The researcher wants to undertake 2 related tasks: first of all, the researcher wishes to add to our knowledge about the effect of institutional arrangements on parties and parliament members by shedding light on an often neglected institution: parliamentary cameral procedures. The second objective of this research is to innovatively examine how the combination of political institutions, and specifically electoral systems, intra-party candidate selection processes and parliamentary cameral procedures, and their interaction with one another influence the way legislators’ behave and the degree to which parties are acting in unison. I aim to investigate the nature of the relationships between political institutions and politicians’ behaviour, in order to improve theory and help practitioners in designing institutions, which lead to better political representation and greater democratic stability. Both tasks are valuable for the advancement of the study of legislative behavior and parties. In its core the project seek to answer how do the institutional arrangements within which legislators and parties operate shape and influence their behavior?'