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InfoAggregation SIGNED

Information Aggregation in Elections

Total Cost €

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EC-Contrib. €

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Partnership

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Project "InfoAggregation" data sheet

The following table provides information about the project.

Coordinator
RHEINISCHE FRIEDRICH-WILHELMS-UNIVERSITAT BONN 

Organization address
address: REGINA PACIS WEG 3
city: BONN
postcode: 53113
website: www.uni-bonn.de

contact info
title: n.a.
name: n.a.
surname: n.a.
function: n.a.
email: n.a.
telephone: n.a.
fax: n.a.

 Coordinator Country Germany [DE]
 Total cost 616˙003 €
 EC max contribution 616˙003 € (100%)
 Programme 1. H2020-EU.1.1. (EXCELLENT SCIENCE - European Research Council (ERC))
 Code Call ERC-2014-STG
 Funding Scheme ERC-STG
 Starting year 2015
 Duration (year-month-day) from 2015-07-01   to  2020-06-30

 Partnership

Take a look of project's partnership.

# participants  country  role  EC contrib. [€] 
1    RHEINISCHE FRIEDRICH-WILHELMS-UNIVERSITAT BONN DE (BONN) coordinator 616˙003.00

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 Project objective

Elections are the foundation for democratic decision making. This research program will examine the effects of biased and privately informed entities—election organizers—on the ability of elections to aggregate information: Existing theory demonstrates that large electorates can reach correct decisions by aggregating information dispersed among many voters. However, existing theory does not account for the ubiquitous presence of biased organizers who intend to affect the election outcome. Examples of biased organizers may include a CEO holding a shareholder vote, a regional government holding a referendum, and political parties in general elections.

This project will develop and analyze new models of voting that account for the effects of biased organizers on information aggregation. One of the examples I consider is an election organizer who can increase voter participation at some cost (e.g., through advertising). Preliminary work suggests that the presence of biased organizers has significant impact. As increasing participation becomes cheap, equilibria exist where the election organizer recruits a large number voters and yet the majority votes almost surely for the organizer’s favorite policy. This failure of information aggregation contrasts starkly with existing results for elections in which the number of voters is exogenously large.

I will study the effectiveness of institutional safeguards against such manipulation, including supermajority rules, publicity requirements, and the regulation of communication to voters, and I will apply the theory in the context of shareholder voting and corporate control. Thus, this research program has important implications for the design of elections in realistic voting scenarios.

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The information about "INFOAGGREGATION" are provided by the European Opendata Portal: CORDIS opendata.

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