GAMES
Game theory and cooperation from economics to evolutionary biology
| Coordinatore | UNIVERSITAET BASEL
Organization address
address: Petersplatz 1 contact info |
| Nazionalità Coordinatore | Switzerland [CH] |
| Totale costo | 241˙482 € |
| EC contributo | 241˙482 € |
| Programma | FP7-PEOPLE
Specific programme "People" implementing the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Community for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2007 to 2013) |
| Code Call | FP7-PEOPLE-2009-IIF |
| Funding Scheme | MC-IIF |
| Anno di inizio | 2010 |
| Periodo (anno-mese-giorno) | 2010-09-01 - 2012-08-31 |
Partecipanti
| # | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 |
UNIVERSITAET BASEL
Organization address
address: Petersplatz 1 contact info |
CH (BASEL) | coordinator | 241˙482.40 |
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Obiettivo del progetto (Objective)
'I will use game theory to study how ideas initially developed in economics can be applied to the problem of the evolution of cooperation in biology. Cooperation is usually explained by evolutionary theory by invoking iterations, which allow reciprocation, punishment or reputation effects; the prisoner’s dilemma has become the standard model to analyse these problems. However, there are other possible explanations and different, more appropriate theoretical models that can shed light on the problem. First, in a bilateral relationship in which one individual contracts another to carry out an action, setting the right costs and rewards of the interaction may lead the possible partners to screen themselves according to their own interest. Moreover, by making the reward conditional on the outcome of the effort, an individual can give an incentive to the partner to cooperate even in the absence of iterations. These two ideas are known in microeconomics as adverse selection and moral hazard. In the first part of my research I will develop similar models for evolutionary biology, analyse the differences of the assumptions and extend the models to cases of biological interest. Second, social dilemmas arising in N-person games can often be more properly described as a volunteer’s dilemma, in which if volunteering is costly, but so is failure to produce the public good, cheaters can invade and form a stable mixed equilibrium with cooperators. The dilemma is that the benefit for the group decreases with group size because the larger the group is, the less likely it is that someone volunteers. I will analyse this problem for cases in which individuals are related, more than one volunteer is needed and other specific assumptions. This will provide predictions that will be tested with behavioural experiments and will ultimately provide practical solution for the production of collective goods.'