TAP

Trading and post-trading

Coordinatore	FONDATION JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT,TOULOUSE SCIENCES ECONOMIQUES    more Spiacenti, non ci sono informazioni su questo coordinatore. Contattare Fabio per maggiori infomrazioni, grazie.
Nazionalità Coordinatore	France [FR]
Totale costo	696˙000 €
EC contributo	696˙000 €
Programma	FP7-IDEAS-ERC Specific programme: "Ideas" implementing the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Community for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2007 to 2013)
Code Call	ERC-2011-ADG_20110406
Funding Scheme	ERC-AG
Anno di inizio	2012
Periodo (anno-mese-giorno)	2012-06-01   -   2017-05-31

 Partecipanti

#	participant	country	role	EC contrib. [€]
1	FONDATION JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT,TOULOUSE SCIENCES ECONOMIQUES  Organization address address: ALLEE DE BRIENNE, Manufacture des Tabacs 21 city: TOULOUSE postcode: 31000 contact info Titolo: Ms. Nome: Celine Cognome: Claustre Email: send email Telefono: 33567732764 Fax: 33561128637	FR (TOULOUSE)	hostInstitution	696˙000.00
2	FONDATION JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT,TOULOUSE SCIENCES ECONOMIQUES  Organization address address: ALLEE DE BRIENNE, Manufacture des Tabacs 21 city: TOULOUSE postcode: 31000 contact info Titolo: Prof. Nome: Bruno Cognome: Biais Email: send email Telefono: 33561128589 Fax: 33561128637	FR (TOULOUSE)	hostInstitution	696˙000.00

Mappa

 Word cloud

Esplora la "nuvola delle parole (Word Cloud) per avere un'idea di massima del progetto.

 Obiettivo del progetto (Objective)

'Two of the main functions of financial markets are to discover equilibrium prices, thus providing useful information to the economy, and to enable investors to realize mutually beneficial trades. For markets to serve these goals, it is necessary that i) investors be matched efficiently and trade at prices accurately reflecting relevant information, and that, ii) transactions be executed without counterparty or payment failure. These conditions can fail due to informational frictions (limited rationality, search costs or adverse selection) or opportunistic behaviour.

I will study the following issues: How can different trading and post-trading mechanisms mitigate or worsen these problems? Are financial market equilibria information constrained optima? Is there a role for public policies? Is algorithmic trading economically and socially useful? Can investors and institutions’ opportunistic behaviour generate counterparty risk? How do informational frictions affect market liquidity? What are the welfare properties of such trading institutions as electronic order books, high-frequency algorithmic trading, margin deposits, and central clearing counterparties?

To study these issues, I will rely on theoretical models, and empirical analyses of financial markets data.'