JANE

Judicial Accountability in New Europe

Coordinatore	Masarykova univerzita    more  Organization address address: Zerotinovo namesti 9 city: BRNO STRED postcode: 60177 contact info Titolo: Mr. Nome: Ji?í Cognome: Jaroš Email: send email Telefono: +420 549 494 804 Fax: +420 549 491 270
Nazionalità Coordinatore	Czech Republic [CZ]
Totale costo	50˙000 €
EC contributo	50˙000 €
Programma	FP7-PEOPLE Specific programme "People" implementing the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Community for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2007 to 2013)
Code Call	FP7-PEOPLE-2011-CIG
Funding Scheme	MC-CIG
Anno di inizio	2012
Periodo (anno-mese-giorno)	2012-09-01   -   2014-08-31

 Partecipanti

#	participant	country	role	EC contrib. [€]
1	Masarykova univerzita  Organization address address: Zerotinovo namesti 9 city: BRNO STRED postcode: 60177 contact info Titolo: Mr. Nome: Ji?í Cognome: Jaroš Email: send email Telefono: +420 549 494 804 Fax: +420 549 491 270	CZ (BRNO STRED)	coordinator	50˙000.00

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 Obiettivo del progetto (Objective)

'This research project deals with mechanisms of judicial accountability in Central and Eastern Europe and the impact of introducing a judicial council on the use of these mechanisms. However, these issues cannot be studied in the abstract. For this reason, the project examines the use of mechanisms of judicial accountability in the Czech Republic and Slovakia as well as the impact of introducing the Judicial Council of Slovak Republic on the use of these mechanisms. The empirical part of the project is built around four central hypotheses. First, in both countries the executive branch and/or the court presidents are dominant “accounting agents” (principals) of judges, whereas the public is a marginal “accounting agent” (principal) of judges. Second, in both countries mechanisms of judicial accountability that allow the dominant “accounting agents” to hold judges to account are preferred to other available mechanisms of judicial accountability. Third, in both countries de facto judicial accountability significantly differs from de iure judicial accountability. Fourth, introduction of a judicial council in Slovakia enhanced overall judicial accountability, enhanced accountability of judges to their respective court presidents, and increased the gap between de facto judicial accountability and de iure judicial accountability. The project is divided into three parts. Part I defines the notion of judicial accountability, identifies mechanisms of judicial accountability and provides a typology of models of the court administration in Europe. Parts II focuses exclusively on the Czech Republic and Slovakia and tests the four hypotheses mentioned above. It first identifies the mechanisms of judicial accountability employed by each country between 1993 and 2010 and subsequently measures them against to the criteria developed earlier in the chapter. Part III looks beyond the borders of the Czech Republic and Slovakia and addresses the broader normative implications.'