GAPS

Guiding Physical Security by Proofs

 Coordinatore ECOLE POLYTECHNIQUE FEDERALE DE LAUSANNE 

 Organization address address: BATIMENT CE 3316 STATION 1
city: LAUSANNE
postcode: 1015

contact info
Titolo: Prof.
Nome: Serge
Cognome: Vaudenay
Email: send email
Telefono: +41 21 6937696
Fax: +41 21 6936870

 Nazionalità Coordinatore Switzerland [CH]
 Totale costo 199˙317 €
 EC contributo 199˙317 €
 Programma FP7-PEOPLE
Specific programme "People" implementing the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Community for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2007 to 2013)
 Code Call FP7-PEOPLE-2013-IEF
 Funding Scheme MC-IEF
 Anno di inizio 2014
 Periodo (anno-mese-giorno) 2014-04-01   -   2016-03-31

 Partecipanti

# participant  country  role  EC contrib. [€] 
1    ECOLE POLYTECHNIQUE FEDERALE DE LAUSANNE

 Organization address address: BATIMENT CE 3316 STATION 1
city: LAUSANNE
postcode: 1015

contact info
Titolo: Prof.
Nome: Serge
Cognome: Vaudenay
Email: send email
Telefono: +41 21 6937696
Fax: +41 21 6936870

CH (LAUSANNE) coordinator 199˙317.60

Mappa

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 Word cloud

Esplora la "nuvola delle parole (Word Cloud) per avere un'idea di massima del progetto.

fundamental    channel    attacks    shortcomings    black    security    models    cryptography    leakage    implementations    computation    cryptographic    resilient    box    proof    schemes    physical    theory   

 Obiettivo del progetto (Objective)

Traditionally, cryptography views cryptographic schemes as black-boxes. An adversary may have access to its inputs and outputs, but the internal computation within the box stays secret. Unfortunately, many real-world attacks have illustrated that the black-box model is overly optimistic. So-called side-channel attacks exploit the physical nature of cryptographic implementations and break security by, e.g., measuring the device's power consumption, its running time, or by inducing faults into the computation. This fundamental gap between black-box security analysis and physical reality has inspired a large body of recent work on leakage resilient cryptography.

While results on the theory of leakage resilient cryptography certainly show that weakening the black-box assumption is possible, prominent criticism has been raised arguing that security proofs in these models say little about the actual security against relevant side-channel attacks. Hence, they are only of very limited use to guide cryptographic engineers when designing secure cryptographic implementations. Important shortcomings of the current-state-of-the-art range from fundamental issues with the current modeling approach to the fact that proposed schemes are too inefficient or neglect implementation details.

The goal of this project is to resolve these shortcomings and develop a sound theory for physical security based on the proof-driven design approach. To take the next step towards a proof-driven design approach for physical security, we will work on three main objectives: (1) Better models and constructions for masking schemes, (2) better designs for leakage resilient symmetric cryptography, and (3) the development of a computer-aided physical security analysis.

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