ECOMATCH

Economics of Matching Markets: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations

Coordinatore	FONDATION NATIONALE SCIENCES POLITIQUES    more Spiacenti, non ci sono informazioni su questo coordinatore. Contattare Fabio per maggiori infomrazioni, grazie.
Nazionalità Coordinatore	France [FR]
Totale costo	1˙119˙000 €
EC contributo	1˙119˙000 €
Programma	FP7-IDEAS-ERC Specific programme: "Ideas" implementing the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Community for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2007 to 2013)
Code Call	ERC-2012-StG_20111124
Funding Scheme	ERC-SG
Anno di inizio	2013
Periodo (anno-mese-giorno)	2013-01-01   -   2018-09-30

 Partecipanti

#	participant	country	role	EC contrib. [€]
1	FONDATION NATIONALE SCIENCES POLITIQUES  Organization address address: RUE SAINT GUILLAUME 27 city: PARIS CEDEX 07 postcode: 75341 contact info Titolo: Mr. Nome: Olivier Cognome: Romeo Email: send email Telefono: +33 1 45 49 83 70 Fax: +33 1 45 49 72 17	FR (PARIS CEDEX 07)	hostInstitution	1˙119˙000.00
2	FONDATION NATIONALE SCIENCES POLITIQUES  Organization address address: RUE SAINT GUILLAUME 27 city: PARIS CEDEX 07 postcode: 75341 contact info Titolo: Prof. Nome: Alfred Cognome: Galichon Email: send email Telefono: +33 6 75 12 12 89 Fax: +33 1 45 49 72 57	FR (PARIS CEDEX 07)	hostInstitution	1˙119˙000.00

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 Obiettivo del progetto (Objective)

'This project offers a theoretical and empirical investigation of matching markets. Matching is, broadly speaking, the study of complementarities, which explains the formation of coalitions. Matching models are found in many applied fields within Economics: Labour Economics, Family Economics, Consumer theory of differentiated goods (hedonic models), Trade, etc. Desirable properties of these coalitions, such as stability, lead to testable implications of the surplus that individuals generate in a match, allowing for structural estimation of matching models.

The goal of this proposal is to expand the frontiers of the theory of matching to design a very general and highly flexible model of matching that will lend itself to estimation and thus lead to empirical findings in various fields of Economics. Based on promising work initiated by the PI, this proposal seeks to bridge the gap between the theory and the empirics of matching markets that was traditionally observed in this literature.

Particular focus will be given to situations where stable outcomes may not exist (such as unipartite, or one-to-many matching models), frictions, taxes. In these cases, a thorough investigation is carried on what solution concept should be used, and what are the testable implications.

Applications will be given to various empirical issues or policy relevant questions such as: - The nature of the complementarities between senior and junior employees within teams, - The role played by the marriage market in the problem of rural depletion in China, - The impact of CEO risk aversion on assignment to firms, and on the CEO compensation package, - The pricing of attributes of French wines.'