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Frontiers in Design SIGNED

Frontiers in Mechanism Design: Methodology and Applications

Total Cost €

EC-Contrib. €

Partnership

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Outcomes and
results

Frontiers in Design project word cloud

Explore the words cloud of the Frontiers in Design project. It provides you a very rough idea of what is the project "Frontiers in Design" about.

outside firms big retailers assign banks data latter lacks provides revisit repeatedly companies employ private governments interact canonical once ways transparency economics cutting markets online certifiable designer employers they fail world schools public literature intervention auctions insurance constrained soft almost commitment appear offers efficient commits employees relies informed chooses unmanageable entire mechanisms mechanism assumptions profitable match contractual attempt tools foundations optimization class personalized privileged worldwide edge standard cornerstone labour engineering agents precisely revelation priori interacts optimal fundamental students helped turns assumes principal unverifiable government situations paradigm practitioners interrelationship

Project "Frontiers in Design" data sheet

The following table provides information about the project.

Coordinator	UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON Organization address address: GOWER STREET city: LONDON postcode: WC1E 6BT website: n.a. contact info title: n.a. name: n.a. surname: n.a. function: n.a. email: n.a. telephone: n.a. fax: n.a.
Coordinator Country	United Kingdom [UK]
Project website	https://frontiersindesign.wixsite.com/frontiersindesign/team
Total cost	1˙644˙774 €
EC max contribution	1˙644˙774 € (100%)
Programme	1. H2020-EU.1.1. (EXCELLENT SCIENCE - European Research Council (ERC))
Code Call	ERC-2015-CoG
Funding Scheme	ERC-COG
Starting year	2016
Duration (year-month-day)	from 2016-09-01 to 2021-08-31

Partnership

Take a look of project's partnership.

#	participants	country	role	EC contrib. [€]
1	UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON Organization address address: GOWER STREET city: LONDON postcode: WC1E 6BT website: n.a. contact info title: n.a. name: n.a. surname: n.a. function: n.a. email: n.a. telephone: n.a. fax: n.a.	UK (LONDON)	coordinator	1˙644˙774.00

Map

Project objective

Mechanism design is the engineering side of economics. Research findings in this field have helped governments and practitioners worldwide design better institutions: auctions that are more profitable or efficient; labour markets that improve the match between employees and employers; and better ways to assign students to public schools. The cornerstone of mechanism design is the revelation principle, which provides a canonical class of mechanisms and turns the mechanism-selection problem (which a priori may appear unmanageable) to a constrained optimization problem. The standard mechanism design paradigm relies on three fundamental assumptions: 1. The designer of the institution—the principal—does not have any privileged information. 2. The principal chooses the mechanism and commits to it once and for all. 3. There is no interrelationship of the mechanism with outside markets. In addition, almost the entire mechanism design literature assumes that private information is unverifiable (soft). These assumptions often fail in today’s “big data” world: Firms (online retailers, insurance companies, banks) do have privileged—and often certifiable—information that may affect contractual terms they propose. Also, they interact repeatedly with the same agents and, as they learn about them, they attempt to change the terms by making personalized offers. Finally, often a mechanism—e.g. a government insurance program—interacts with private insurance markets. The proposed research aims at providing methods and foundations to design optimal mechanisms at precisely those highly relevant situations: 1. mechanism-design by an informed principal, 2. design of mechanisms and their transparency when the principal lacks commitment, 3. mechanism-design when an intervention interacts with markets. The latter part of the project aims to employ these cutting-edge tools to revisit the design of insurance markets.

Publications

List of publications.
year	authors and title	journal	last update
2019	FrÃ©dÃ©ric Koessler, Vasiliki Skreta Selling with evidence published pages: 345-371, ISSN: 1555-7561, DOI: 10.3982/te2885	Theoretical Economics 14/2	2019-08-05

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The information about "FRONTIERS IN DESIGN" are provided by the European Opendata Portal: CORDIS opendata.