Opendata, web and dolomites

Frontiers in Design SIGNED

Frontiers in Mechanism Design: Methodology and Applications

Total Cost €

0

EC-Contrib. €

0

Partnership

0

Views

0

 Frontiers in Design project word cloud

Explore the words cloud of the Frontiers in Design project. It provides you a very rough idea of what is the project "Frontiers in Design" about.

mechanism    world    unverifiable    outside    constrained    helped    latter    online    certifiable    economics    personalized    fundamental    lacks    standard    canonical    students    edge    commits    designer    precisely    relies    soft    priori    attempt    assumptions    private    class    interact    efficient    tools    they    optimization    big    retailers    labour    offers    banks    auctions    paradigm    profitable    governments    public    interacts    employ    mechanisms    interrelationship    once    insurance    companies    cutting    markets    government    firms    appear    schools    fail    revelation    employers    cornerstone    engineering    chooses    transparency    situations    provides    contractual    practitioners    optimal    commitment    foundations    intervention    repeatedly    entire    principal    ways    worldwide    turns    agents    almost    match    assumes    literature    privileged    employees    informed    unmanageable    revisit    assign    data   

Project "Frontiers in Design" data sheet

The following table provides information about the project.

Coordinator
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON 

Organization address
address: GOWER STREET
city: LONDON
postcode: WC1E 6BT
website: n.a.

contact info
title: n.a.
name: n.a.
surname: n.a.
function: n.a.
email: n.a.
telephone: n.a.
fax: n.a.

 Coordinator Country United Kingdom [UK]
 Project website https://frontiersindesign.wixsite.com/frontiersindesign/team
 Total cost 1˙644˙774 €
 EC max contribution 1˙644˙774 € (100%)
 Programme 1. H2020-EU.1.1. (EXCELLENT SCIENCE - European Research Council (ERC))
 Code Call ERC-2015-CoG
 Funding Scheme ERC-COG
 Starting year 2016
 Duration (year-month-day) from 2016-09-01   to  2021-08-31

 Partnership

Take a look of project's partnership.

# participants  country  role  EC contrib. [€] 
1    UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON UK (LONDON) coordinator 1˙644˙774.00

Map

 Project objective

Mechanism design is the engineering side of economics. Research findings in this field have helped governments and practitioners worldwide design better institutions: auctions that are more profitable or efficient; labour markets that improve the match between employees and employers; and better ways to assign students to public schools. The cornerstone of mechanism design is the revelation principle, which provides a canonical class of mechanisms and turns the mechanism-selection problem (which a priori may appear unmanageable) to a constrained optimization problem. The standard mechanism design paradigm relies on three fundamental assumptions: 1. The designer of the institution—the principal—does not have any privileged information. 2. The principal chooses the mechanism and commits to it once and for all. 3. There is no interrelationship of the mechanism with outside markets. In addition, almost the entire mechanism design literature assumes that private information is unverifiable (soft). These assumptions often fail in today’s “big data” world: Firms (online retailers, insurance companies, banks) do have privileged—and often certifiable—information that may affect contractual terms they propose. Also, they interact repeatedly with the same agents and, as they learn about them, they attempt to change the terms by making personalized offers. Finally, often a mechanism—e.g. a government insurance program—interacts with private insurance markets. The proposed research aims at providing methods and foundations to design optimal mechanisms at precisely those highly relevant situations: 1. mechanism-design by an informed principal, 2. design of mechanisms and their transparency when the principal lacks commitment, 3. mechanism-design when an intervention interacts with markets. The latter part of the project aims to employ these cutting-edge tools to revisit the design of insurance markets.

 Publications

year authors and title journal last update
List of publications.
2019 Frédéric Koessler, Vasiliki Skreta
Selling with evidence
published pages: 345-371, ISSN: 1555-7561, DOI: 10.3982/te2885
Theoretical Economics 14/2 2019-08-05

Are you the coordinator (or a participant) of this project? Plaese send me more information about the "FRONTIERS IN DESIGN" project.

For instance: the website url (it has not provided by EU-opendata yet), the logo, a more detailed description of the project (in plain text as a rtf file or a word file), some pictures (as picture files, not embedded into any word file), twitter account, linkedin page, etc.

Send me an  email (fabio@fabiodisconzi.com) and I put them in your project's page as son as possible.

Thanks. And then put a link of this page into your project's website.

The information about "FRONTIERS IN DESIGN" are provided by the European Opendata Portal: CORDIS opendata.

More projects from the same programme (H2020-EU.1.1.)

DISINTEGRATION (2019)

The Mass Politics of Disintegration

Read More  

PROGRESS (2019)

The Enemy of the Good: Towards a Theory of Moral Progress

Read More  

KEYNESGROWTH (2020)

Economic Fluctuations, Productivity Growth and Stabilization Policies: A Keynesian Growth Perspective

Read More