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Frontiers in Design SIGNED

Frontiers in Mechanism Design: Methodology and Applications

Total Cost €

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EC-Contrib. €

0

Partnership

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 Frontiers in Design project word cloud

Explore the words cloud of the Frontiers in Design project. It provides you a very rough idea of what is the project "Frontiers in Design" about.

constrained    outside    schools    optimal    informed    data    labour    efficient    public    markets    contractual    mechanism    revelation    economics    assign    retailers    once    employees    interrelationship    class    agents    interacts    privileged    assumes    online    certifiable    interact    cutting    personalized    cornerstone    standard    commits    revisit    auctions    private    governments    priori    employ    literature    world    optimization    profitable    chooses    situations    fail    insurance    provides    fundamental    banks    entire    lacks    latter    practitioners    companies    unmanageable    relies    big    students    attempt    offers    foundations    tools    commitment    soft    helped    assumptions    worldwide    precisely    appear    employers    almost    they    paradigm    match    repeatedly    mechanisms    intervention    ways    edge    firms    unverifiable    principal    government    engineering    transparency    canonical    turns    designer   

Project "Frontiers in Design" data sheet

The following table provides information about the project.

Coordinator
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON 

Organization address
address: GOWER STREET
city: LONDON
postcode: WC1E 6BT
website: n.a.

contact info
title: n.a.
name: n.a.
surname: n.a.
function: n.a.
email: n.a.
telephone: n.a.
fax: n.a.

 Coordinator Country United Kingdom [UK]
 Project website https://frontiersindesign.wixsite.com/frontiersindesign/team
 Total cost 1˙644˙774 €
 EC max contribution 1˙644˙774 € (100%)
 Programme 1. H2020-EU.1.1. (EXCELLENT SCIENCE - European Research Council (ERC))
 Code Call ERC-2015-CoG
 Funding Scheme ERC-COG
 Starting year 2016
 Duration (year-month-day) from 2016-09-01   to  2021-08-31

 Partnership

Take a look of project's partnership.

# participants  country  role  EC contrib. [€] 
1    UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON UK (LONDON) coordinator 1˙644˙774.00

Map

 Project objective

Mechanism design is the engineering side of economics. Research findings in this field have helped governments and practitioners worldwide design better institutions: auctions that are more profitable or efficient; labour markets that improve the match between employees and employers; and better ways to assign students to public schools. The cornerstone of mechanism design is the revelation principle, which provides a canonical class of mechanisms and turns the mechanism-selection problem (which a priori may appear unmanageable) to a constrained optimization problem. The standard mechanism design paradigm relies on three fundamental assumptions: 1. The designer of the institution—the principal—does not have any privileged information. 2. The principal chooses the mechanism and commits to it once and for all. 3. There is no interrelationship of the mechanism with outside markets. In addition, almost the entire mechanism design literature assumes that private information is unverifiable (soft). These assumptions often fail in today’s “big data” world: Firms (online retailers, insurance companies, banks) do have privileged—and often certifiable—information that may affect contractual terms they propose. Also, they interact repeatedly with the same agents and, as they learn about them, they attempt to change the terms by making personalized offers. Finally, often a mechanism—e.g. a government insurance program—interacts with private insurance markets. The proposed research aims at providing methods and foundations to design optimal mechanisms at precisely those highly relevant situations: 1. mechanism-design by an informed principal, 2. design of mechanisms and their transparency when the principal lacks commitment, 3. mechanism-design when an intervention interacts with markets. The latter part of the project aims to employ these cutting-edge tools to revisit the design of insurance markets.

 Publications

year authors and title journal last update
List of publications.
2019 Frédéric Koessler, Vasiliki Skreta
Selling with evidence
published pages: 345-371, ISSN: 1555-7561, DOI: 10.3982/te2885
Theoretical Economics 14/2 2019-08-05

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